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ABSTRACT: The United States Supreme Court has decided in a number of cases how 
Section One 1 of the Sherman Act should apply to agreements that potentially harm 
competition. In recent key cases, the Court stated that the rule of reason is the default 
rule in antitrust. Second, per se condemnation (or some rebuttable presumption) is 
reserved for a limited group of practices that economics and experience show that the 
type of agreement under consideration is inevitably destructive of competition with 
little or no redeeming features. Third, reasonable people can disagree about the likely 
competitive effects of a particular type of agreement. Therefore, lower courts going 
forward should apply the rule of reason on a case by case basis to determine whether 
there is any likelihood of competitive harm and any likelihood of significant procom-
petitive benefits. However, lower courts should structure and streamline their analysis 
by applying one or more rules of thumb. 
The Supreme Court followed this basic approach in Leegin, applying the rule of reason 
to resale price maintenance agreements (vertical price fixing), and in Actavis, apply-
ing the rule of reason to pay-for-delay agreements involving branded and generic 
pharmaceutical manufacturers. This essay explores where this strategy has been suc-
cessful (Actavis) and where it has not (Leegin). I focus not on the substantive law but 
instead on the institutions and incentives in antitrust enforcement that ensure that the 
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pronouncements of the law on the books by the Supreme Court gets translated into the 
law in action in the lower courts and the real world.
KEYWORDS: Antitrust, Competition, Institutions, Incentives, Enforcement.
I. Introduction
One of the most vexing questions in U.S. antitrust law is the meaning of 
the rule of reason under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The U.S. Supreme 
Court has struggled for over a century to give meaning to the broad lan-
guage of the Sherman Act banning contracts, combinations, and conspir-
acies in restraint of trade.1 The modern Supreme Court has a relatively 
new interpretative strategy to consider what legal standard should apply to 
agreements that potentially harm competition. 
The Court’s methodology can be paraphrased as follows. First, the Court 
states that the rule of reason is the default rule in antitrust. Second, per se 
condemnation (or some rebuttable presumption) is reserved for a limited 
group of practices that economics and experience show to be inevitably 
destructive of competition with little or no redeeming features. Third, 
reasonable people and lower courts disagree about the likely competi-
tive effects of the type of agreement under consideration. Therefore, lower 
courts going forward should apply the rule of reason on a case by case basis 
to determine whether there is any likely competitive harm and any likely 
significant procompetitive benefits. However, lower courts also should 
structure and streamline their analysis by applying a number of guidelines 
that the Court identifies. The Supreme Court then moves onto the next 
case on its docket and assumes that the lower courts will work things out.
The Supreme Court followed this basic approach in the 2007 Leegin case,2 
applying the rule of reason to resale price maintenance agreements (verti-
cal price fixing), and in the 2013 Actavis decision,33 applying the rule of 
reason to pay-for-delay agreements (reverse payments) involving branded 
and generic pharmaceutical manufacturers. These two very different cases 
represent the most recent cases discussing how to apply the rule of reason 
under Section One of the Sherman Act.
1 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
2 Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
3 FTC v. Actavis, 570 U.S. 136 (2013).
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This essay explores where this strategy has been successful (Actavis) and 
where it has not (Leegin) and what best explains these divergent results. I 
focus less on the substantive law and instead emphasise the institutions 
and incentives in antitrust enforcement that determine when the pro-
nouncements of the law on the books by the Supreme Court gets translated 
into the law in action in the trenches in the lower courts. I conclude with 
suggestions for the Court in future antitrust cases to best ensure that its 
pronouncements are taken seriously and that adequate litigation develop 
to apply this type of structured rule of reason analysis in the real world.
II. The rule of reason in antitrust
The rule of reason has become the default rule in analysing the legality of 
agreements under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.4 While a handful of types 
of hard-core cartel agreements between competitors remain categorically 
unlawful (per se unreasonable),5 the remainder of horizontal and vertical 
agreements are analysed on a case by case basis to determine whether they 
unreasonably harm competition.6
The Supreme Court has returned time and time again to whether certain 
types of agreements should be considered categorically unreasonable or 
whether they must be analysed under a full rule of reason analysis on a 
case by case basis. Once horizontal price fixing agreements were declared 
per se unreasonable in Socony Vacuum,7 the Court over the next thirty 
years held a wide variety of both horizontal and vertical agreements to 
4 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
5 Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990); FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Lawyers Association, 
493 U.S. 411 (1990); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); Catalano, 
Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., 310 
U.S. 150 (1940).
6 Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); see also Ohio v. American Express 
Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018); Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 
3 (1997); Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pac. Stationery, 472 U.S. 284 (1985); NCAA v. Board of 
Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); National Society 
of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville 
Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961). Tying agreements remain quasi-per se unlawful and a partial excep-
tion from this trend, see Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
7 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
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be per se unreasonable.8 Beginning with the GTE case in 1977,9 the Court 
reversed course, finding most type of agreements other than hard-core 
cartels subject to the rule of reason and establishing no new per se rules.10
In the modern era, the Court usually begins with the notion that agree-
ments should be judged under the rule of reason unless it is manifestly 
clear that from an economic perspective such agreements are inevitably 
destructive of competition and devoid of legitimate procompetitive justifi-
cations. The Court has described the legal standard for agreements under 
Section 1 as a spectrum running from an irrebuttable presumption to a 
full rule of reason analysis where the plaintiff bears the burden of pleading 
and proving that the agreement, on balance, significantly harms competi-
tion and that outweighs any legitimate procompetitive justifications the 
defendants may offer. From time to time, the Court has adopted in deed, 
if not words, a middle ground where inherently suspicious agreements are 
presumed harmful and the burden shifts to the defendant to offer a legiti-
mate procompetitive justification or risk losing under the rule of reason.11 
Regardless of the legal standard, the courts only rarely get to the final stage 
of balancing harm against the legitimate procompetitive justifications 
offered by the defendants.12
The Supreme Court also has addressed when a defendant’s asserted 
procompetitive justifications are legitimate. From the earliest days of the 
Sherman Act, it has rejected defences that competition itself is harmful for 
a particular industry and that anticompetitive agreements were necessary 
to survive.13 It similarly has rejected attempts to justify hard-core cartel 
agreements on the grounds that the defendants lacked market power 
or that the price agreed upon was a reasonable one.14 More controver-
8 United States v. Topco Associations, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & 
Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-
Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 
(1958); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
9 Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
10 See cases cited in note 5.
11 California Dental Association v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999); FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 
476 U.S. 447 (1986); Board of Regents v. NCAA, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
12 See Michael A. Carrier, “The four-step rule of reason”, Antitrust 33, no. 2 (2019): 50; Michael A 
Carrier, “Rule of reason: An empirical update for the 21st century”, George Mason Law Review 16, 
no. 4 (2009): 827; Michael A. Carrier, “The real rule of reason: Bridging the disconnect”, BYU Law 
Review 1999, no. 4 (1999): 1265. 
13 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U.S. 290, 547-48 (1897).
14 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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sially, the Court further has rejected arguments that agreements harmed 
competition, but nonetheless promoted other aspects of social welfare, 
whether health or safety or other societal norms.15
It is therefore fairly easy to determine whether the per se rule or the full 
rule of reason applies in a particular case or which party has the burden 
of pleading and proof at a particular stage of the case. However, the Court 
has not spent anywhere near the same amount of time setting forth the 
standards of what is supposed to actually happen once the full rule of rea-
son applies. As a result, the full rule of reason has been criticised as mean-
ing little more than everything is relevant and nothing is determinative.16 
Some critics have gone further and contended that the rule of reason vio-
lates the rule of law.17 
 
III. The diverging paths of Actavis and Leegin
The Supreme Court has only just begun to address what a plaintiff must 
establish to show a violation of the rule of reason and whether there are any 
meaningful guideposts or rules of thumb along the way. In the past twelve 
years, the Court has decided two Section 1 Sherman cases in very different 
areas of antitrust. In both cases, the Court defaulted to its traditional view 
that the rule of reason applies in the absence of hard-core cartel activity. 
However, the Court also went further and offered guidelines for the lower 
courts to use in applying the rule of reason to future cases in the area.
The two cases in question were Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. 
v. PSKS, Inc. (Leegin)18 and FTC v. Actavis.19 Leegin dealt with one of the 
traditional topics of antitrust law, resale price maintenance (vertical price 
fixing). The decision overturned a century of precedent to hold that the 
rule of reason would apply in future cases and offered certain guidelines 
for future litigation. In Actavis, the Court dealt with the far more recent 
phenomenon of “pay-for-delay,” or “reverse payments”, by branded phar-
maceutical makers to keep or delay generic entrants from entering the 
market. Here too, the Court adopted the rule of reason as the appropriate 
legal standard and offered certain guidelines for future cases. 
15 FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Lawyers Association, 493 U.S. 411 (1990); National Society of 
Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
16 Frank Easterbrook, “The limits of antitrust”, Texas Law Review 63, no. 1 (1984): 1.
17 Maurice E. Stucke, “Does the rule of reason violate the rule of law?”, U.C. Davis Law Review 42, 
no. 1 (2009): 1375.
18 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
19 570 U.S.136 (2013).
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Implicit in the Court’s analysis in both cases is the notion that there 
would be substantial subsequent public and/or private lower court deci-
sions to flesh out the guidelines the Court adopted which would provide 
greater guidance to enforcers and private actors and develop a more com-
plete body of antitrust jurisprudence. In reality, the law of resale price 
maintenance (RPM) more or less ended with the Leegin decision, thereby 
making the practice de facto legal at the federal level contrary to the word-
ing of the decision. In contrast, a robust lower court case law developed in 
Actavis fleshing out the guidelines established by the Court and exploring 
many new fact patterns as defendants sought to structure real world con-
duct in the shadow of Actavis.
A. Mismatched incentives and missed opportunities 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Leegin did much more than change the 
legal standard for RPM, it effectively killed all enforcement of the law in 
this area. Leegin dealt with the practice of RPM agreements where a manu-
facturer sought to establish the selling price of the item down the distri-
bution chain. The Supreme Court initially held in 1911 that such agree-
ments were per se illegal.20 Over the years, the scope of that ban waxed and 
waned.21 In more recent times, the Court made it more difficult to prove 
such agreements and held in 1996 that maximum resale price maintenance 
agreements were subject to case by case analysis under the rule of reason.22 
The 5-4 Leegin decision held that all RPM agreements would be subject to 
the full rule of reason.23
The Court noted the rule of reason was the default rule under Section 1 
of the Sherman Act for most agreements outside of hard-core cartels agree-
ments between competitors.24 Categories of agreements would be treated 
as per se unlawful only if they inevitably harmed competition and had no 
meaningful procompetitive justifications.25
20 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
21 State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); Business Electronics. Corp. v. Sharp Electronics. Corp., 485 
U.S. 717 (1988); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corporation, 465 U.S. 752 (1984); Albrecht v. 
Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); Dr. Miles 
Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
22 State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
23 Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
24 Id. at 885.
25 Id. at 886.
M&CLR_IV_1.indd   20 21/04/2020   15:02:01
21Institutions and Incentives in Antitrust Enforcement | Spencer Weber Waller
The Court then identified several potential procompetitive justifications 
for minimum resale price maintenance agreements. Most of these justifi-
cations related to the prevention of free riding by distributors or retailers 
taking advantage of services, investments and efforts being expended by 
competing distributors or retailers.26 
At the same time, the Court identified possible scenarios where resale 
price maintenance agreements could harm competition. These scenarios 
mostly revolved around the use of such agreements being facilitating 
devices for horizontal cartel agreements at either the manufacturer or the 
downstream distribution level.27
Since such agreements had the potential for either pro-or-anti-compet-
itive effects, the Court held that the rule of reason should apply, abandon-
ing the nearly one-hundred-year-old precedent to the contrary. To guide 
the application of the rule of reason in future cases, the Court provided 
some guidelines. The Court stated that RPM agreements were most prob-
lematic when used by firms with market power, when most firms in the 
industry used such agreements, or where the impetus for the agreements 
came from the distribution, rather than the manufacturing level.28
Following Leegin, one would assume that the lower courts would build 
out this structured rule of reason along the guidelines suggested by the 
Supreme Court, with cases eventually returning to the appellate courts 
and the Supreme Court for review and fine tuning. Instead, virtually all 
RPM litigation ceased. Congress considered, but never enacted, legislation 
which would have repealed the holding in Leegin and restored the per se 
rule.29 Some states enacted or maintained per se rules against RPM in their 
state antitrust laws.30
Since Leegin, there have been no cases brought by either the Department 
of Justice Antitrust Division (DOJ) or the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) under either the Bush, Obama, or Trump Administrations, and 
there is no public information suggesting any current investigations of 
such practices. The last such RPM case by either agency appears to be the 
26 Id. at 889-892.
27 Id. at 892-84.
28 Id. at 897-99.
29 Leiv Blad and Margaret Sheer, “A look back at the attempts to repeal Leegin”, CPI Antitrust 
Chronicle, November 2013 (1), https://www.morganlewis.com/news/2013/11/~/media/files/
docs/2013/bladsheernov-13(1).ashx. 
30 Michael A Linday, “Overview of State RPM Laws”, Antitrust Source, April 2017, https://www.
dorsey.com/-/media/files/newsresources/publications/2017/apr17_lindsay_chart.pdf?la=en. 
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DOJ complaint against Playmobil in 1995,31 and an FTC modification of a 
consent decree against Nine West Shoes in light of Leegin in 2008.32 There 
have been a handful of cases brought by State Attorneys General,33 half 
a dozen private cases (none successful),34 and only one federal appellate 
decision since Leegin.35 The lack of enforcement has not escaped the atten-
tion of scholars, who can only speculate how Leegin would apply to future 
challenges to RPM agreements.36
The degree to which private firms use explicit RPM agreements follow-
ing Leegin is difficult to determine. Undoubtedly some additional firms 
31 Complaint, United States v. Playmobil USA, Inc., Case No. 1:95CV00214 (D.D.C. 1995), https://
www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/complaint-183.
32 See Nine West Group Inc., FTC Matter/File Number: 9810386, Docket Number: C-3937 (2008) 
(modifying consent decree in light of Leegin).
33 See e.g., California v. Bioelements, Inc., case no. 10011659 (2011); New York v. Tempur-Pedic 
International, Inc., 30 Misc.3d 986 (2011).
34 Babyage.com, Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 558 F.Supp.2d 575, 583-84 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (discussing 
firm market power); Toledo Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 530 F.3d 204 (3rd Cir. 
2008) (examining a situation in which distributors use vertical restraints to enforce a horizontal 
agreement among themselves); Major League Baseball Properties, Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 
290, 315-16, 334 (2nd Cir. 2008) (finding R/R applies to vertical agreements and rejecting “quick 
look” approach); McDonough v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 638 F.Supp.2d 461, 480-89 (E.D. Pa. 2009) 
(discussing all three factors); O’Brien v. Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc., 294 Kan. 318, 
341-49 (2012) (considering and rejecting reasonableness approach under KA law); but see Kansas 
Restraint of Trade Act, K.S.A. § 50-163 (2013) (passed after O’Brien and requiring harmonization 
with federal antitrust law).
35 See Toledo Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 530 F.3d 204 (3rd Cir. 2008) (exam-
ining a situation in which distributors use vertical restraints to enforce a horizontal agreement 
among themselves).
36 Thomas A. Lambert, “Dr. Miles is dead. Now what?: Structuring a rule of reason for evaluating 
minimum resale price maintenance”, William. & Mary Law Review 50, no. 6 (2009): 1937 (col-
lecting proposed interpretations of the R/R under Leegin); James Mulcahy and Filemon Carillo, 
“Leegin, ten years later: Did vertical agreements remain unlawful per se where adopted to facilitate 
a price-fixing horizontal scheme?”, Franchise Law Journal 38, no. 1 (2018): 129-136 (discussing 
the development of R/R analysis in the area of hybrid vertical/horizontal restraints); Marina Lao, 
“Internet retailing and “free-riding:” A post-Leegin antitrust analysis”, Journal of Internet Law 
14, no. 9 (2011): 20 (discussing the difficulty of prevailing on an RPM claim post-Leegin); Heather 
M. Cooper, “What baby products can teach us about successful distribution strategies”, The 
Federal Lawyer 57, February (2010): 25 (discussing the Babyage case in light of Leegin); Stephen 
J. Marietta, “An apple a day doesn’t keep Doctor Miles away: The second circuit’s misuse of the 
per se rule in United States v. Apple”, Rutgers Law Review 69, no. 1 (2016): 372-77 (discussing 
the Apple decision in light of Leegin and Toledo Mack Trucks); Wan Cha, “A new post-Leegin 
dilemma: Reconciliation of the third circuit’s Toledo Mack case and the second circuit’s Apple 
E-Books case”, Rutgers Law Review 67, no. 6 (2015): 1561-1574 (discussing Apple and Toledo Mack 
Trucks); Theodore Voorhees, Jr., “Reasoning Through the Rule of Reason for RPM”, Antitrust 28, 
Fall (2013): 59-61 (discussing the lack of development in case law).
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utilize such agreements in the wake of Leegin who would not have done 
so before on advice of counsel. Others seem content to use other types of 
vertical agreements or so-called Colgate policies, designed to avoid even 
constituting an agreement, thus avoiding the scope of Section 1 altogeth-
er.37 Empirical information is hard to obtain, particularly for firms which 
operate in international markets, where RPM is often still regarded as a 
hard core offense.38 What is more certain is that there is no substantial 
post-Leegin jurisprudence to develop the rule of reason in line with the 
framework provided by the Court.
B. A robust law of pay-for-delay
The precise opposite occurred during roughly the same time frame with 
respect to so-called “reverse payments” or “pay-for-delay” agreements in 
the pharmaceutical industry. This issue largely arose because of the unin-
tended consequences of the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984, which sought to 
create easier entry for generic drugs and create more competition for high 
priced branded pharmaceutical products.39
The Hatch-Waxman Act created a pathway for quicker entry by generic 
drugs by establishing an abbreviated regulatory approval process for 
generic drugs which were bioequivalent to their branded competitors. To 
increase the incentives for generic entrants and force litigation of weak 
patents, the first such generic competitor would receive 180 days of exclu-
sive market access before any further generic entry could take place. At the 
same time, the branded pharmaceutical producer was given a set period 
to file a patent infringement suit against the new generic entrant. The new 
entrant could then defend on the basis that the patent was invalid, unen-
forceable, or otherwise not infringed (a very difficult argument for a chem-
ically identical compound).40
37 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
38 See e.g., James Killick, “European Commission fines for resale price maintenance in e-com-
merce”, White & Case, 2018, https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/european-commis-
sion-fines-resale-price-maintenance-e-commerce. 
39 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Public Law 98-417, U.S. Statues at 
Large 98 (1984): 1585.
40 See generally Herbert Hovenkamp et. al, IP and Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles 
Applied to Intellectual Property Law, 3rd edition (United States of America: Wolters Kluwer Legal 
& Regulatory U.S., 2017), § 16.01A; Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., “FTC v. Actavis: The Patent-Antitrust 
Intersection Revisited”, North Carolina Law Review 93, no. 2 (2015): 375 (discussing incentives in 
Hatch-Waxman for generic entry).
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Unlike an ordinary patent infringement suit where settlement nor-
mally involved the defendant paying the plaintiff to avoid liability, a dif-
ferent practice arose in patent litigation under the Hatch-Waxman Act. 
The plaintiff branded pharmaceutical manufacturers began offering the 
allegedly infringing generic producer defendant increasingly large sums 
of money and other consideration to refrain or delay from entering the 
market and avoid possible invalidation of the weak patents. 
These payments had several troubling effects. They leave the branded 
pharmaceutical producer as the sole maker of the drug in question for the 
full length of the patent and allowing it to price much higher than would 
have been the case once generic entry took place. Second, the generic was 
effectively barred from the market for the period specified in the settle-
ment agreement. Third, other generic competitors were effectively barred 
by the misdrafted statutory provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act granting 
the initial generic entry of 180 days of exclusivity following its entry, where 
the clock never begins to run because of the settlement agreement.
These agreements had the effect of allowing the branded pharmaceutical 
maker to retain whatever market power it obtained from an often legally 
questionable patent in return for sharing a portion of its monopoly profits 
with the first generic entrant. At the same time such agreements effec-
tively blocked the initial generic entry and all further generic entry for the 
remainder of the life of the patent. Antitrust challenges shortly followed.
The lower courts split as to whether such agreements were per se unlaw-
ful, subject to the rule of reason, or presumptively lawful if within the 
scope of the patent held by the branded pharmaceutical manufacturer.41 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this split in the lower court 
in FTC v. Actavis.42 In its 5-4 opinion, the Court held that such agreements 
were subject to the full rule of reason. 
Once again, it offered some guidelines for the application of the rule of 
reason in the lower courts. The Court stated that such agreements were 
most suspect where there were 1) unjustifiably large payments flowing from 
the plaintiffs to the defendants in the patent litigation; 2) the plaintiff’s 
41 In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation, 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride 
Antitrust Litigation, 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 
466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006); Schering-Plough v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005); In re Cardizem 
CD Antitrust Litigation, 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
42 570 U.S. 136 (2013).
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patent claims were weak; and 3) there was a lack of other procompetitive 
justifications for the agreements in question.43
Actavis led to the flowering of subsequent public and private litigation. 
The FTC continued to bring cases normally resulting in consent decrees or 
victory in administrative litigation and on appeal.44 Private treble damage 
class actions increased in number and scope despite Actavis requiring a rule 
of reason, rather than a per se or quick look approach.45 State attorneys gen-
eral continued to investigate and litigate pay-for-delay and related health 
43 Id. at 154-58.
44 Impax Laboratories, Inc., FTC, 2017 WL 5171124, (2017); F.T.C. v. AbbVie Inc., 107 F.Supp.3d 
428, 435-36 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (finding that neither a settlement allowing a competitor to produce a 
generic 6 years earlier, nor one granting a favourable supply deal constituted a reverse payment); 
F.T.C. v. Cephalon, Inc., 36 F.Supp.3d 527, 531-32 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (rejecting FTC’s argument that 
under Actavis the relative strength or weakness of the patent is irrelevant to the analysis of the 
settlement).
45 In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litigation, 968 F.Supp.2d 367, 390-93 (D. Mass. 2013) 
(considering factors and defining the Court’s use of “payment” to include non-monetary consid-
eration); In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litigation, 42 F.Supp.3d 231, 262-65, 285-86 (D. 
Mass. 2014) (applying burden-shifting analysis for reverse payments); In re Niaspan Antitrust 
Litigation, 42 F.Supp. 735, 750-53, 755-56 (E. D. Pa. 2014) (concluding that reverse payments can 
include non-monetary consideration and discussing the strength of the underlying patent litiga-
tion); In re Lipitor Antitrust Litigation, 46 F.Supp.3d 523, 542-549 (D.N.J. 2014) (collecting cases 
in defining “payment” and “large payment”); Time Ins. Co. v. Astrazeneca AB, 52 F.Supp.3d 705, 
709-712 (E. D. Pa. 2014) (collecting cases on cash vs. non-cash settlements and discussing whether 
decision in a reverse-payment case requires litigation of the underlying patent issue); United Food 
and Commercial Workers Local 1776 & Participating Employers Health and Welfare Fund v. 
Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc., 74 F.Supp.3d 1052, 1066-75 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (proposing and apply-
ing 4-step test); King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., 88 F.Supp.3d 402 (E.D. Pa. 
2015) (applying burden-shifting test); In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litigation, 94 F.Supp.3d 224, 241-
45 (D. Conn. 2015) (defining “large,” “unjustified,” and “payment”); In re Cipro Cases I & II, 348 
P.3d 845, 865-69 (2015) (proposing factors and applying burden-shifting test); King Drug Co. of 
Florence, Inc. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388, 399-413 (3rd Cir. 2015) (holding that a 
no-AG settlement could constitute a reverse-payment); In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litigation, 
133 F.Supp.3d 734, 751 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (concluding that even a partial settlement agreement can 
be subject to Actavis scrutiny); In re Opana ER Antitrust Litigation, 162 F.Supp.3d 704, 716-721 
(N.D. Ill. 2016); In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litigation, 814 F.3d 538 (1st Cir. 2016) (holding that 
non-cash reverse payments fall under the scope of Actavis); In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litigation, 
199 F.Supp.3d 662, 663-69 (D. Conn. 2016) (discussing market power); In re Asacol Antitrust 
Litigation, 233 F.Supp.3d 247, 261-264 (D. Mass. 2017) (pleading large and unjustified payment); 
In re Lipitor Antitrust Litigation, 855 F.Supp.3d 126, 146 (3rd Cir. 2017) (concluding that reverse 
payment allegations didn’t present question of patent law vesting jurisdiction in the Fed. Cir.); In 
re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litigation, 261 F.Supp.3d 307, 329-338 (D.R.I. 2017) (discussing the 5 
factors and proposing and applying a 4-step analysis for reverse payments); In re Wellbutrin XL 
Antitrust Litigation, 868 F.3d 132, 160-63 (3rd Cir. 2017) (concluding that even a partial settle-
ment agreement can be subject to Actavis scrutiny); In re Lipitor Antitrust Litigation, 868 F.3d 231, 
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care cases individually and in coalitions through the National Association 
of Attorneys General (NAAG).46 Congress considered numerous legisla-
tive fixes but has not eliminated the basic flaws in the institutional design 
of Hatch-Waxman and continues to ponder additional legislative fixes.47 
These antitrust issues have become part of the public discourse and the 
2020 presidential campaign proposals by leading candidates.48
Business practices have evolved as well in the wake of Actavis. The phar-
maceutical industry has resorted to a variety of additional techniques 
beyond the type of reverse payments specifically at issue in Actavis to pro-
tect monopoly profits for high priced blockbuster drugs facing the prospect 
of generic entry. These have included non-cash payments to generic com-
petitors, agreements structured as payments for services as distributors 
and otherwise to such firms, as well as unilateral use of so-called branded 
generics, product hopping, evergreening, use of citizen petitions to delay 
entry, and so-called patent thickets.49
As a result, the federal trial and appellate courts have had a steady flow 
of government and private cases to address and apply the rules of the road 
set forth in Actavis. Not every factor has been comprehensively addressed, 
and lower courts continue to be split on certain key issues. But the spirit of 
Actavis has been honoured and there has developed an antitrust common 
law for the Supreme Court and Congress to consider moving forward.
IV. Every cause of action must have a champion
Someone must be willing to bring a case for effective enforcement to ensue. 
More colloquially, there must be a champion ready to take on the quest. 
In U.S. competition law there are multiple potential champions for all the 
available causes of actions. However, not all are ready for a particular quest 
for any number of reasons including ideology, institutional commitment, 
publicity, resource allocation, or risk aversion. 
249-262 (3rd Cir. 2017) ; In re Namenda Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, 331 F.Supp.3d 152, 
197-99 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2018) (applying burden-shifting analysis).
46 See infra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Michael Carrier, “Statement by Michael A. Carrier to Health Subcommittee of House Committee 
on Energy & Commerce”, 2019, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3352629; 
Michael Carrier, “Five Years After Actavis: A Brief Case Study”, IP Watchdog, June 18, 2018, 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/06/18/ftc-v-actavis-stand-5-years/id=98536/. 
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As a result, there have been many champions bringing pay-for-delay 
cases both before and after Actavis. In contrast, none of the likely enforc-
ers has been willing to take up the RPM challenge, and Leegin effectively 
meant the end of meaningful enforcement rather than its continued 
development.
A. The many champions taking on pay-for-delay
The first and foremost champion of attacking pay-for-delay agreements 
has been the U.S. Federal Trade Commission. The FTC has been the tra-
ditional antitrust enforcer for health care antitrust issues involving the 
pharmaceutical industry and hospitals, while the Antitrust Division has 
focused more on the antitrust aspects of health care insurance and medi-
cal devices. This informal allocation of enforcement responsibility led the 
FTC to focus on pay-for-delay agreements in the wake of the passage and 
unintended consequences of the Hatch-Waxman Act. 
This interest and experience was the result of research, hearings, and 
reports,50 litigation,51 and later amicus briefs in support of private litiga-
tion.52 The FTC brought several cases which were litigated or settled by 
consent decrees prior to Actavis and ably litigated Actavis all the way to a 
close victory in the Supreme Court. Since Actavis, the FTC has continued 
to pay close attention to the pay-for-delay field, continued to bring cases,53 
filed amicus briefs,54 monitored agreements that seek to delay generic 
50 Federal Trade Commission. Pay-For-Delay: How Drug Company Pay-Offs Cost Consumers 
Billions: A Federal Trade Commission Staff Study (2010), https://www.ftc.gov/reports/pay-delay-
how-drug-company-pay-offs-cost-consumers-billions-federal-trade-commission-staff; Federal 
Trade Commission, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study (2002), https://
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/generic-drug-entry-prior-patent-expiration-
ftc-study/genericdrugstudy_0.pdf.
51 See e.g., FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (2012); Schering-Plough Corp. 
v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1074-1075 (C.A.11 2005).
52 Brief of Federal Trade Commission as Amicus Curaie in Support of Plaintiff-Appellants, King 
Drug Co. of Florence v. Smithkline Beechum Corp., 791 F.3d 388 (3rd Cir. 2015); Brief of Federal 
Trade Commission as Amicus Curaie in Support of Defendants, Takeda Pharmaceutical Co. v. 
Zydus Pharmaceuticals, 358 F.Supp.3d 389 (D.N.J. 2018), available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/media-resources/mergers-competition/pay-delay.
53 See cases cited in notes 44, 45.
54 In re Wellbutrin Antitrust Litigation, 868 F.3d 132 (3rd Cir. 2017).
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entry,55 and identified pay-for-delay as an enforcement priority on its web-
site56 and to Congress.57
Congress has shown great interest in this topic and has conducted hear-
ings on pay-for-delay agreements and subsequent variations. Numerous 
bills have been considered to prohibit or limit such practices.58 In addi-
tion, generic entry and the high price of pharmaceutical products is a hot 
topic in the 2020 presidential campaign.59 While the proposed legislation 
55 “Agreements Filed with the Federal Trade Commission under the Medicare Prescription 
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 Overview of Agreements Filed in FY 2016 
A Report by the Bureau of Competition”, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/
agreements-filled-federal-trade-commission-under-medicare-prescription-drug-improvement/
mma_report_fy2016.pdf. 
56 “Pay for delay”, Federal Trade Commission, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/
mergers-competition/pay-delay; Joshua D. Wright, “FTC v. Actavis and the Future of Reverse 
Payment Cases”, Federal Trade Commission, September 26, 2013, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/public_statements/ftc-v.actavis-future-reverse-payment-cases/130926actavis.pdf.
57 See e.g., “Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Before the United States Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer 
Rights”, Federal Trade Commission, September 17, 2019, at 6-8, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/public_statements/1544480/senate_september_competition_oversight_testimony.pdf. 
58 See e.g., U.S. Congress, Senate, Affordable Medications Act, S. 1801, 116th Congress, introduced 
in Senate June 12, 2019, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1801; U.S. 
Congress, Senate, Food and Agribusiness Merger Moratorium and Antitrust Review Act of 2019, 
S. 1596, 116th Congress, introduced in Senate May 22, 2019, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-
congress/senate-bill/1596/text; U.S. Congress, House, Strengthening Health Care and Lowering 
Prescription Drug Costs Act, H.R. 987, 116th Congress, introduced in House February 6, 2019, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/987; U.S. Congress, House, Creating 
and Restoring Equal Access to Equivalent Samples Act of 2019 (CREATES Act of 2019), H.R. 965, 
116th Congress, introduced in House February 5, 2019, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-con-
gress/house-bill/965/text; U.S. Congress, House, Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act 
of 2019, H.R. 1499, 116th Congress, introduced in House March 5, 2019, https://www.congress.
gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/1499?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22s+485%22%5D%7D; 
U.S. Congress, Senate, Affordable Prescriptions for Patients Act of 2019, S. 1416, 116th Congress, 
introduced in Senate May 9, 2019, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1416; 
U.S. Congress, House, Stop Significant and Time-wasting Abuse Limiting Legitimate Innovation of 
New Generics Act (Stop STALLING Act), H.R. 2374, 116th Congress, introduced in House April 29, 
2019, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/2374/text; U.S. Congress, Senate, 
Stop Significant and Time-wasting Abuse Limiting Legitimate Innovation of New Generics Act (Stop 
STALLING Act), S. 1224, 116th Congress, introduced in Senate April 29, 2019, https://www.con-
gress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1224/text. 
59 See e.g., Emmarie Hutteman, “Klobuchar wants to stop pay-for-delay deals that keep drug prices 
high”, Politifact, April 25th, 2019, https://www.politifact.com/health-check/statements/2019/
apr/25/amy-klobuchar/klobuchar-wants-stop-drugmakers-bad-practice-keeps/; “Healthcare”, Joe 
Biden, https://joebiden.com/healthcare/ (“Generics help reduce health care spending, but brand 
drug corporations have succeeded in preserving a number of strategies to help them delay the 
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and campaign proposals have not yet been enacted, the issue remains a 
hot topic of great political salience and a spur to both public and private 
enforcement.
State Attorneys General also have stepped into the arena to challenge 
agreements delaying generic entry. The issues of drug pricing has great 
political resonance for an elected State Attorney and the public. While the 
scope of these cases probably limits enforcement to the larger and most 
committed states to tackle on their own,60 the states have been able to coor-
dinate their activities and resources through the National Association of 
Attorneys General to form a credible team to undertake such complex liti-
gation.61 As a result, coalitions of States have investigated and challenged 
pay-for-delay agreements and also joined with the FTC on key cases.62
Private enforcers have been eager to bring treble damage cases usually in 
the form of class actions.63 Many of the cases have been brought by union 
welfare funds and municipalities directly affected by the continued high 
prices of branded pharmaceutical products. Private cases constituted the 
majority of the pre-Actavis cases which created the split in the lower courts 
as to the proper standard of legality for such agreements leading up to 
the Actavis decision by the Supreme Court and continue to dominate the 
docket of current pay-for-delay cases.
Finally, businesses seem to be willing to risk antitrust challenge in order 
to deter generic entry because of the enormous sums of money involved 
in prolonging the period prior to generic entry. Generic entry is the single 
greatest factor in declining prices for branded pharmaceutical products 
entrance of a generic into the market even after the patent has expire); “Affordable Medicine for 
All:A Plan to Slash Drug Prices and Boost Pharmaceutical Innovation”, Pete for America, https://
storage.googleapis.com/pfa-webapp/documents/PFA_Affordable%20Medicines%20for%20
All_%20white%20paper.pdf (“Pete will end the pay-for-delay deals.”)
60 “Attorney General Becerra Secures Nearly $70 Million against Several Drug Companies for 
Delaying Competition and Increasing Drug Prices”, National Association of Attorneys General, 
July 29, 2019, https://members.naag.org/assets/files/Antitrust/files/07-29-2019%20Attorney%20
General%20Becerra%20Secures%20Nearly%20%2470%20Million%20against%20Several%20
Drug%20Companies.pdf (California settlement in pay-for-delay case).
61 “Edo Agrees to State Enforcement of Injunctive Relief After Attempting to Block Generic Drugs: 
States create enforcement fund to stop future anticompetitive conduct”, National Association of 
Attorneys General, July 19, 2019, https://members.naag.org/assets/files/Antitrust/files/7-19-19%20
Utah%20Lidoderm%20settlement.pdf (describing antitrust settlement with coalition of seventeen 
State Attorneys General).
62 Id. 
63 Federal Rule Civil Procedure 23.
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following the expiration of the relevant patents.64 The stakes involved 
seem to justify the legal risks of suspect strategies to disguise pay-for-delay 
agreements or their equivalents through non-cash payments, provisions of 
minor services by the generic entrant, thin joint ventures, outright acquisi-
tions, and various unilateral marketing strategies to accomplish the same 
goals of maintaining monopoly profits as long as possible. 
B. The failed search for a champion to take on resale price maintenance
The story for life after Leegin reads very differently. Resale price mainte-
nance became the orphan of antitrust enforcement, ignored by its former 
champions or so far down the list of priorities that it essentially vanished 
in terms of enforcement and meaningful lower court decisions.
The Antitrust Division has been ideologically averse to challenging 
this type of vertical restraint since the 1980s. It had to be restrained by 
Congress from filing amicus briefs against the per se treatment of RPM in 
the Monsanto case in the 1980s.65 In Leegin itself, the Justice Department 
actually filed an amicus brief (along with the FTC) on behalf of the defend-
ants once the case reached the Supreme Court.66 
The Antitrust Division’s priorities remain hard-core cartel prosecutions 
and merger enforcement. The Division further investigates the occasional 
Section 2 case and from time to time brings civil horizontal rule of reason 
cases. Given these priorities and virtually unlimited discretion as to what 
type of case the Division chooses to pursue, there is little reason to expect 
that any new RPM cases any time soon. In the more recent Apple e-books 
litigation, the Antitrust Division chose to focus on a horizontal agreement 
by book publishers by the downstream e-book distributor rather than the 
vertical RPM type elements of the case.67 There has been nothing recently 
in this area from the FTC either as it has pursued its own other priorities 
including its heavy investment in research, advocacy, and litigation in the 
64 Aaron S. Kesselheim, Michael S. Sinha, and Jerry Avorn, “Determinants of market exclusivity 
for prescription drugs in the United States”, JAMA Internal Medicine 177, no. 11 (2017): 1658-1664.
65 See also Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Svc. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
66 Brief of Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Leegin Creative 
Leather Products, Inc., v. PSKS, INC., 551 U.S. 877 (2007), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/amicus_briefs/leegin-creative-leather-products-inc.v.psks-inc.d/b/kays-
kloset...kays-shoes/070122leegin06-480amicuspdc.pdf. 
67 U.S. v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1376 (2016). See generally 
Chris Sagers, United States v. Apple: Competition in America (United States of America: Harvard 
University Press, 2019). 
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pharmaceutical sector as well as its other antitrust, consumer protection, 
and privacy enforcement activities.
Congress also has lost interest in restoring the per se rule for RPM or 
pressing the enforcers to do more under the structured rule of reason. 
Several unsuccessful bills were introduced to reverse the Leegin decision.68 
Congress then turned its attention to other aspects of antitrust law and 
enforcement often relating to big tech or specific mergers of interest to 
rankings committee members. Even with the renewed interest in antitrust 
as a political and election interest, RPM has not been a significant com-
ponent of the current spate of bills, campaign platforms, or the political 
debate. 
The states were the closest thing to a champion that emerged. Certain 
states enacted or maintained statutory or common law per se prohibitions 
on RPM.69 State Attorneys General brought a handful of cases against 
RPM agreements,70 but enforcement remained sporadic and subject to 
resource constraints and competing priorities of individual states and 
NAAG coalitions. 
Few private cases emerged. The expected value of such litigation is low 
versus other types of antitrust cases and other types of litigation that cli-
ents and class action lawyers choose to bring. Lengthy, expensive, uncer-
tain, and relatively low damage cases such as RPM will be rarely worth the 
risk that cautious profit maximizing plaintiffs and their counsel choose 
to bring. There will rarely be a single purchaser with enough at stake to 
make such litigation attractive. These same factors also make class actions 
unlikely given the more winnable and larger damage cases available 
elsewhere.
Most potential defendants also avoid pressing the envelope by either 
flouting the law or creating creative but legally risky workarounds that 
are likely to attract new enforcement efforts or new legislative attention. 
The possibility of litigation in states where RPM remains per se unlaw-
ful is one such deterrent. The more general hostility to RPM outside the 
U.S. is another deterrent to businesses who seek a single global marketing 
68 See e.g., Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act, S.B. 148, 11th Cong. (2009); Discount Pricing 
Consumer Protection Act, S.B. 75, 112th Cong. (2011); Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act, 
H.R. 3406, 112th Cong. (2011).
69 See Lindsay, supra note 30.
70 Id.
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plan.71 So-called Colgate plans which unilaterally announce desired resale 
prices and then cease doing business with discounters without any agree-
ment at all are a third option since such plans, if well-structured, are not 
deemed agreements at all, thus falling outside the purview of Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act.72 Fourth, firms can use non-price vertical restraints to 
accomplish much of the legitimate goals of RPM in preventing free rid-
ing by distributors or retailers. Finally, firms can directly impose the ser-
vice, warranty, technical knowhow, sales force training, and other desired 
requirements for effective marketing and terminate firms for documented 
failures to comply. 
Without any of the obvious champions to take up the cause, RPM has 
not just become subject to the rule of reason, it approaches per se legality. 
No significant enforcement has ensued despite the apparent prediction of 
the Supreme Court to the contrary.
V. Every champion needs an incentive
Every champion still needs the incentive in order to take on the quest of 
bringing a structured rule of reason under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
There is no obligation for either public or private enforcers to bring this type 
of case versus the myriad of other antitrust cases or other types of litigation.
Public enforcers have not brought many rules of reason Section One 
cases in recent years. The Antitrust Division has prioritized per se unrea-
sonable criminal hard-core cartel cases and major merger cases in recent 
years.73 The Division has invested additional resources in new investiga-
tions of the tech sector under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The FTC has 
emphasised health care cases (including pay-for-delay), major mergers, 
and increasingly devoted resources to monopolization investigation and 
litigation such as the pending case against Qualcomm and current investi-
gations of Google and Facebook.74
71 See generally D. Daniel Sokol, Daniel Crane, and Ariel Ezrachi, Global Antitrust Compliance 
Handbook (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press: 2014) (surveying antitrust provisions of 
numerous jurisdictions).
72 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
73 “2019 ABA Antitrust Spring Meeting: Federal and state antitrust enforcement takeaways”, 
Perkins Coie LLP, Apr. 8, 2019, https://www.perkinscoie.com/en/news-insights/2019-aba-anti-
trust-spring-meeting-federal-and-state-antitrust-enforcement-takeaways.html. 
74 Id. The FTC also has responsibilities for consumer protection cases, privacy cases, and a variety 
of legislative mandates to report on and enforce a variety of statutes. See generally Stephanie W. 
Kanwit, Federal Trade Commission (USA: Thomson Reuters, 2019). 
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At the margins, both agencies have ideological and resource constraints 
that affect any decisions at the margin about opening a new investigation 
or bringing a case outside these existing priorities. Vertical cases of any 
kind are few and far between. When they have been brought, the verti-
cal restraints more often consisted of exclusive dealing arrangements in 
the context of monopoly maintenance or attempted monopolization cases 
such as Microsoft,75 Intel,76 and Qualcomm.77
For private litigation, cases normally need to have a positive expected 
value. Most clients and lawyers bring cases for money damages based on 
the probability of winning and the likelihood and amount of the damages 
and/or attorney fees. Ideologically driven legal reform litigation is rare in 
the antitrust area. 
The shrinking per se rule, even with the rise of a structured rule of rea-
son in some cases, has led to important changes in the number and types 
of private antitrust litigation. Most private antitrust cases are in some way 
related to hard-core cartels because they are easier to win and more likely 
to result in a victory or settlement for the clients and attorney’s fees for 
the lawyers. If the government has prevailed in a criminal prosecution, 
then Section 5 of the Clayton Act creates a presumption of violation that 
private plaintiffs can rely on, although they normally still have to plead 
and proof causation and damages.78 The effect of the Justice Department’s 
amnesty and leniency programme further requires cooperating defend-
ants to cooperate with private plaintiffs as a condition of immunity from 
criminal prosecution.79
Even here, such cases are lengthy, expensive, and uncertain. But they are 
less expensive and more likely to result in a win than cases under the rule 
of reason where the plaintiff’s burden is higher and the defendant’s justifi-
cations more numerous.
Unless a client is able to pay for a lengthy, expensive, uncertain rule of 
reason case through hourly fees, such cases are normally brought on a 
75 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
76 Intel Corp., FTC, 2009 WL 5576196 (2009). 
77 FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2019), avail-
able at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/qualcomm_findings_of_fact_and_con-
clusions_of_law.pdf. 
78 15 U.S.C. §16(a) (2011).
79 In return, the successful amnesty applicant is only liable for single damages on its portion of the 
sales of the price fixed products or services. See The Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and 
Reform Act of 2004, Public Law 111-190, U.S. Statutes at Large 124 (2010): 1275.
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contingent fee basis. Private counsels normally shrewdly evaluate all such 
potential cases carefully to determine not just whether the case is likely 
to produce a positive expected value but whether it is likely to produce a 
greater expected value than the universe of other types of antitrust cases 
and all the other types of cases the lawyers are already handling or consid-
ering taking on. If the firm or firms seek to finance a case through external 
litigation funding, the funder will similarly be making this kind of calcu-
lation if deciding whether to invest in this case or some other antitrust case 
or type of litigation.80 
The lack of incentive is an important reason why no existing champion 
has come forward to develop the case law of Leegin and many have done 
so in the pay-for-delay area. The public enforcers have prioritised other 
areas of the law and have to some degree an ideological aversion to the 
very theory behind an antitrust challenge to vertical resale price mainte-
nance. Private enforcers have simply put their money elsewhere in search 
of greener pastures.
In pay-for-delay cases, the FTC (in both Democratic and Republican 
administrations) has put its institutional prestige behind cases building 
on the legacy of Actavis. State attorneys general find such cases appealing 
both on the merits and in terms of the favourable publicity they generate. 
Private antitrust counsel find Actavis type class actions a potentially prof-
itable positive expected value type of class, on a par with straight ahead 
per se horizontal price fixing cases, because of the ability of specialised 
lawyers, law firms, and expert witnesses to rely on the Actavis presump-
tions and the enormous potential damages for such cases. 
VI. Rules of thumb for the real world
Given the dynamics of how institutions and incentives affect how lower 
courts and parties develop the general principles outlined by the Supreme 
Court in these cases, the question remains: how can we do better? In part, 
the problem is with the composition of the Court itself. The Court in 
recent years has been dominated by Justices who previously worked in the 
Executive Branch, as appellate lawyers, and/or as appellate judges prior to 
their nomination to the Supreme Court.
80 “A brief introduction to litigation Finance”, LexShares, https://www.wealthforge.com/hubfs/
LexShares-Litigation-Finance-Whitepaper.pdf.
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There have been few recent members of the Supreme Court who made 
their living litigating in the federal or state trial courts prior to their enter-
ing the judiciary. Justice Stevens was the last, and only member of the 
Court since the 1970s, who practiced as a litigator and trial lawyer in the 
antitrust area.81 Few, if any, more recent Justices worked in the trenches 
applying these types of general and vague antitrust principles in the real 
world where the law is often easy but the facts are devilishly hard to deter-
mine, plead, and prove. In addition, almost none of the current or recent 
Justices have served as district court judges engaged in the process of 
applying general principles to new and challenging factual settings.82 
The result has been a Court with a kind of Olympian detachment with 
broad oracular pronouncements where the mere mortals of the bar and 
the lower courts have to decipher the application of these antitrust rules 
of thumbs in new settings without any further guidance. These rules of 
thumbs are an improvement of merely establishing that the rule of reason 
applies to a category of agreements, but no further guidance. However, if 
the Supreme Court is serious about establishing a structured version of the 
rule of reason, rather than one where everything is relevant and nothing 
determinative, it needs to do better. Rules of thumb require more than 
simply directions to the lower courts to consider a checklist.
Even if the composition of the Court is unlikely to change, the Court 
needs a more nuanced understanding of who is most likely to bring these 
cases and what incentives exist for them to do so. The Court further must 
have some understanding of the trend line they seem to have established 
in these cases. If the Court has over time loosened the substantive rules 
in a way that favours defendants, continued doctrinal development is less 
likely. In addition, if the Court has over time tightened the procedural 
requirements for successful plaintiffs (for antitrust or in general), contin-
ued doctrinal development is similarly less likely to occur. More generally, 
anything that lessens the expected value of a claim by a public or private 
plaintiff will produce less litigation in that area and more litigation in other 
antitrust or unrelated areas.
81 Spencer Weber Waller, “Justice Stevens and the rule of reason”, SMU Law Review 62, no. 2 
(2009): 693.
82 In addition, the lower courts often engage in a form of a guerrilla warfare willfully ignoring 
or subverting Supreme Court precedent in antitrust and other areas of the law. See William L. 
Reynolds and Spencer Weber Waller, “Legal process and the past of antitrust”, SMU Law Review 
48, no. 5 (1995): 1811.
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The Court can do better in several ways. First, with respect to case selec-
tion, the Court has virtually unlimited discretion of which cases it wishes 
to hear through the certiorari process. It may simply be better for the Court 
to decline to hear antitrust cases where the only likely outcome is the selec-
tion of the rule of reason as the substantive standard and a token effort as 
establishing rules of thumb. Without some further detail or analysis of 
what is likely to happen next and how lower court cases will actually be 
brought, the lower courts may be better off just working out these matters 
on their own.
If the Court does take certiorari, the Court, the parties, and amici can 
address the issues of the likely real-world impact of the Court’s decision 
in their briefs and arguments. Alternatively, the Court can ask for sup-
plemental briefing as to what rules of thumb should apply in a subsequent 
rule of reason case and who are the most likely parties to bring such cases. 
Members of the Court can ask these questions to the parties, amici who 
have been granted oral argument, the general counsel of the Federal Trade 
Commission, or the United States Solicitor General, who is often invited to 
express the view of the Executive Branch in private antitrust cases before 
the Court. The Court further has the power to appoint counsel to advocate 
positions not taken by the parties. Such steps would serve the traditional 
purposes of oral argument in the Supreme Court is to explore the real-
world policy impact of potential new legal rules and give guidance in other 
cases.83
In the hour of oral argument normally granted in most cases, some mem-
ber of the Court has time to ask whether the federal enforcement agencies 
plan to make such cases a future priority, whether the States are likely to 
do so, and whether there is a likely private plaintiff or plaintiff class who 
will bring the cases necessary to develop and apply the structured rule of 
reason being developed by the Court. Finally, the Supreme Court needs to 
regularly follow up over time with cases in the area to ensure that litigants, 
businesses, and the lower courts adhere to and develop the framework 
established in the initial landmark case.
Lower courts can embrace, rather than duck, the opportunity provided 
by the Supreme Court in developing a structured rule of reason by faithfully 
analysing and applying the soft presumptions provided by the Supreme 
83 Stephen M. Shapiro (author, ed.), Kenneth S. Geller, Timothy S. Bishop, Edward A. Hartnett, and 
Dan Himmelfarb (eds.), Supreme Court Practice, 10th edition (USA: Bloomberg BNA, 2013), 816.
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Court and the developing law throughout the lower courts. In government 
cases, the lower courts can insist that such issues be addressed in proposed 
consent decrees settling such cases.84 In private cases, the lower courts 
need heightened awareness of the role they have been asked to play and 
provide deep analysis, and not just lip service, to the structured rule of rea-
son they are being asked to apply at the district court and appellate level. 
Magistrate judges, special masters, and even court appointed experts can 
be enlisted to ensure that the parties make the necessary record when the 
right case presents itself to apply the rule of reason in the manner dictated 
by the Supreme Court. This will in turn create a more fully developed and 
sophisticated record for the Supreme Court to analyse for the next such 
antitrust case it chooses to hear and decide in this manner.
Congress can also support the courts in ensuring that there are proper 
champions and incentives to develop the rules of thumb and structured 
rule of reason developed by the Court. Congress can reinforce or revise 
the legal standards and soft presumptions developed by the Court in both 
legislation and hearings. Even if Congress does not change the substantive 
outcome of cases like Leegin and Actavis, it can examine the issue of the 
enforcement priorities of the FTC and Antitrust Division through hear-
ings on appointments, budget, and oversight. In addition, committees and 
members of Congress can request information from the agencies about 
what cases they bring, what cases they choose not to bring, and about 
future enforcement priorities.85
VII. Conclusion
Bringing meaning to the rule of reason in U.S. competition law is an endur-
ing, but difficult, task. The Supreme Court should be commended when 
it develops rules of thumb or soft presumptions to guide rule of reason 
cases in the lower courts. However, the Court and the many other institu-
tions that comprise U.S. competition policy need to be aware that rules of 
thumbs without new cases are not enough. Without understanding when 
and how new cases are forthcoming and when they are not, the Court’s 
pronouncements produce unintended consequences like the wholesale 
abandonment of areas of case law and continued guerrilla warfare by ren-
egade lower courts.
84 Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1974).
85 See generally Spencer Weber Waller, “Antitrust and Democracy”, Florida State University Law 
Review 46, no. 4 (2019): 807-860.
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Every cause of action needs a champion, and every champion needs the 
incentive to go into battle. The Supreme Court needs to understand this 
simple but vital notion of what happens, and why, once rules and presump-
tions are established and the Court has moved on to other matters. Only 
then will the Court ensure that its antitrust holdings contribute to the 
development of competition policy as intended and do not wither for lack 
of future enforcement.
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